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Donna Haraway. Manifestly Haraway. The Cyborg Manifesto. The Companion Species 
Manifesto. Companions in Conversation (with Cary Wolfe). Posthumanities 37. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  2016. 
 
While familiar with Haraway's writing, I’ve been very slow in eating my way through 
this new collection over the last six months.  I've ingested the essays in tiny bites – 
not only because the prose is so often rich and moving – but mainly because her 
work is so good to think.  Looking at my annotated copy every other line is 
underlined or starred and so I realise what a difficult task it is going to be to capture 
the complexity of her thought alongside conveying the passion and revolution of her 
work. 
 
Rereading the manifestoes excites me in a way that only Michel Foucault and 
Marilyn Strathern have done in the past. This is not because I didn't read the earlier 
versions carefully enough. Rather it's because I am now able to read them from a 
different place.  Specifically, it has taken many years to shed something that has got 
in my way before – something to do with having been brought up in a particular 
tradition of argument and empiricism in sociology that circulates the object-subject 
divide as well as separating (good) epistemology from ethos, ethicality, and matters 
of care (see also Puig de la Bellacasa, 2012, and Thompson, 2013). Additionally I am 
now reading Haraway through my having been moved and rewritten by a life that 
includes having babies and keeping a family of animals as well as taking up 
opportunities for research that has followed medicine back to biology. So too I am 
immersed in the politics of a cultural revolution: the enmeshing of life and flesh with 
digital technology, cyber technoscience and genomic imaginaries, and the acute 
need to preserve and cherish the stuff of our planet of which we are only one 
expression.   
 
In all this I have been travelling backwards to retrie e a sense of those matters –
affect, care, relationality, and immersion in the mess – which are so crucial to 
knowledge-making and to reassembling the social. While each of these is so easily 
excluded by sociology’s three gods of empiricism, functionalism and analytic 
argument, what is helping me to reverse direction is a growing tradition that brings 
together what is normally held a part.  This is a tradition (for all the irony that such a 
term implies) that presses natureculture re-members humans as temporary 
expressions of, and as made-up of, the same stuff of the worlds they study (see for 
example Chiew’s, 2014, insightful discussion of Cary Wolfe’s and Karen Barad’s 
work), and that technology and animals are as co-constitutive of the social as 
humans (see for example Michael, 2000). Putting themselves into a relation of 
extraction with the world is not only dangerous for humans as well as for the world 
(Heidegger 1996), as Stengers (2010) and Latour (2004) point out, scientists cannot 
and should not do that anyway because it is simply not good science. 
 
In Manifestly Haraway the manifestos – created around two tropes - the ‘cyborg’ 
and ‘companion species’ – are laid alongside an extended conversation between 
herself and the critical theorist Cary Wolfe. In this conversation as well as the 
introduction Wolfe helps explicate how Haraway’s work expresses a feminine vision 
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which is both erudite and razor sharp, but also kind and funny.  He talks of  the 
swagger of Haraway's rhetorical performance – her irony and how her writing is in 
itself so liberatory. While still insisting on the need for community, Haraway says in 
the Cyborg Manifesto that irony and the politics of blasphemy are protectors from 
being swayed by the moral majority. Blasphemy is what Haraway calls a ‘category 
deviance’. Indeed, both cyborgs, the conjoining of flesh and machine that 
increasingly underpins human life, and companion species, the becomings that 
humans in affective relations with nonhuman others make, are blasphemous 
because they undo the categories that hold up the world as we know it. 
 
In rereading these two manifestoes together I think what is so extraordinary is how 
Haraway’s writing helps us experience what she is trying to help liberate: a new way 
of working and thinking as social scientists. By this I mean she helps us to pay 
attention to how all the boundaries in place that hide our connectivity, our 
interdependency and our relationality are themselves connected. The boundaries 
her work challenges are between the human and the animal, organism and machine, 
the virtual and the fleshy, the literary and the scientific, the poetic and the 
functional, affect and effect. Haraway’s writing makes possible a vision in which 
every move we make, every step we take, everything we create is underpinned by 
the historicity of how these divisions are enacted.   
 
Specifically, she helps illuminate how these divisions help support relations of 
asymmetry, domination and oppression between humans and others, including 
other humans, because how the way in which these divisions are worked body-forth 
and manifest asymmetries in power between different classes of being: ‘reasonable’, 
privileged, powerful, often heterosexual, white and masculine as against 
unreasonable, disadvantaged, weak, often black and female, sometimes also gay or 
lesbian. What she asserts is how in the nexus of entanglements between how 
division is done are possibilities for reproduction of asymmetrical power relations, 
including capitalism’s worst excesses of war and oppression.  This is what her work – 
when we read these manifestos and the conversations together – has accomplished 
– and it is a truly remarkable feat. Yet she is, as she puts it, neither a technobunny 
nor an all out critic of technology and of science.  Rather she offers us – as part-
creators and inextricable users of technology and science – a different way of doing 
technology and science.  For example, she does not want us to abandon genomic 
thought but urges us to see genomics differently – that we are made up of, 
dependent upon and share the same stuff of the world as other creatures.  
 
Donna Haraway gets us out of empiricist and analytical forms of argument – this is 
what Strathern (1998) also calls us to in the second Chapter of Gender of the Gift.  
Haraway does this very differently from Strathern but she does it all the same.  
Haraway does not work the old divisions in ways that simply try to invert power 
relations, but finds different ways of thinking, writing and doing as at the same time 
connecting things up that are usually held apart. Strathern manages through her 
comparative method working between Melanesian and Euro-American cultures to 
create conditions of possibility for seeing the destructive modes of thought that 
underpin modernity as at the same time as generating possibilities for thinking 
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differently. Haraway on the other hand works explicitly on the divisions that support 
analytical and empirical thought, bodied forth by the specific ways in which 
technoscience has infiltrated every aspect of life and thought as well as aligned with 
power structures to dominate and oppress, including making war not love.  
 
Haraway’s work then is aimed at not just breaking down the old divisions but to shift 
attention and ways of thinking them that re-invents their connectivity.  She calls this 
an ‘affirmatory biopolitics’ after Esposito (2008), one that stresses kin, not otherness 
or division, and that produces a vision of compost rather than of the post-human. It 
is not just that she shows us that we have never been modern.  She does something 
more than this and it is this ‘more’ that I want to press.  This is because Haraway was 
doing something in cyborg manifesto that when I first read it I did not quite get. To 
borrow from Anneliese Ryles, in the Cyborg Manifesto Haraway gives us the means 
to see the figure of techno-science twice.   She is writing the figure of techno-science 
at the dawn of a new cyber age-the age of digital culture that is about to envelop us. 
Her prescience here is extraordinary. By prescience I am pointing to her exhortation 
in the manifesto to realise how all our techno-scientific invention and creativity can 
be rolled out to underpin relations of domination, or as ways to undo the categorical 
work that makes the figure of human exceptionality possible, and instead press 
relations of kin and connectivity. She recreates the figure of persons as not ever fully 
human in the sense of the sovereign subject, but as always in extension with 
otherness, in this case technological otherness.  In so doing she turns the idea of 
purity (racial, gendered, human) on its head, but she does much more than this. She 
says in the interview with Wolfe in the second half of the book, that cyborg 
manifesto was written out of and with rage. Her rage is at how technoscience is 
entangled with a politics of division and destruction.  A rage born out of her own 
socio-historical positioning: post two world wars, the aftermath of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, Vietnam and resistance to US imperialist politics, with the US as the 
personification of the sovereign subject.  A collective rage and protest: 
 
O Superman,  
O Judge,  
O Mom and Dad. 
Mom and Dad… 
 
And I said, OK. Who is this really? 
And the voice said, this is the hand, the hand that takes. 
This is the hand, the hand that takes. 
This is the hand, the hand that takes. 
Here come the planes. 
They're American planes. 
Made in America, ….  
(Laurie Anderson, ‘O Superman’, from the album Big Science, 1982: 
Warner Bros)   
 
This rage helps her to show how our being, our very fabric, always in extension with 
technology, are constituted by the relations between capitalism and division. But 
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here Haraway illuminates the figure seen twice - how all our creativity and 
inventiveness - our entanglement with technology – could be done otherwise: and 
she unpacks the alternative figure of the cyborg as a metaphor of connection and 
hybridity, and as against the divisions that underpin human exceptionalism and all 
that it supports. In so doing Haraway offers us a new politics of inclusion and 
different possibilities for how technoscience is done.   
 
So this is the figure she turns us towards - cyborg as affirmation of our mixings, of 
relatedness, of connection and of interdependency. This turning the figure of the 
human as always cyborg as a metaphor for how humans live in the world as always 
and forever political is a tour de force in itself. But cyborg manifesto doesn't just 
offer that, it also offers possibilities for reimagining and doing relations differently. 
This difference, this possibility always has to have a focus on the ethics and affects of 
how our techno-human relations are done. That is she insists on focussing how 
techno-human relations create affects and worlds of very particular kinds-kinds that 
support war and division and destruction or worlds of relatedness that hold open 
care for and connection with otherness. 
 
Haraway tells Wolf in their conversation that the Companion Species manifesto was 
in contrast written out of and with love. She exhorts us to make kin not babies. So 
what I think she means here is that our products of conception do not just make the 
‘individuals’ that are so central to modern humans’ thought and forms of socio 
political organisation. But that our conceptions can be understood as both the 
products of relations and connections, mixings and conjoinings. So Haraway’s huge 
move here is to show us in companion species how kinship and inheritance is not 
linear-up and down a chronological tree of life – with each species having a different 
tree.  But also lateral. The who and what we live with, and the world's we make 
together with these who’s and these what’s, make us up as both fleshy and virtual 
beings. So how does she do this?  The stress for Haraway is to make affective 
relationality visible and integral. Here she pushes the leading edge of philosophy to 
the limits. For example she doesn't just hang with Heidegger’s notion of being in the 
world, or of Deleuze’s idea of human beings as becomings.  Rather she asserts the 
perspective through which we can ‘see’ how we are always ‘becoming-with’ others, 
human and non-human, virtual and fleshy, organic and machinic. And in so doing she 
doesn't just with Whitehead press process, but ‘worldings’, as affective relatings of 
connection, mixing and interdependency.  
 
Even more than this perhaps Haraway’s work suggests that if we don't make the 
affective dimension of relations and interdependency visible in our work then our 
work is always partial in both senses of the word and in ways that reproduce a 
particular kind of politics: the politics that supports the asymmetry of divisions 
described earlier, and most particularly the division between the human and the rest 
of the world – of the human as over and above the world. So that rather than 
perpetuating the division between nature and culture, the world and the human, 
with science and technology as her handmaidens, we can think instead in terms of 
naturecultures: how humans are made up of the same fabric as the world they want 
to dominate.  This way of doing social science is very different to how we've been 
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brought up in the empirical traditions of research and theory that we have inherited, 
the analytics of sociological argument which always presses somehow, somewhere 
for objectivity and which performs humans as in command of – as above or 
detached from - the plane of action from which they think and speak.   
 
Haraway writes about how her thinking is only possible because of her rootedness in 
places and times – the USA in the sixties, when war and shame where a part of her 
diet, and then California, in the golden triangle between Berkeley, San Francisco and 
Santa Cruz – with their radical anthropology and feisty politics of alterity and 
resistance to mainstream capitalism -  that made possible a liberatory form of 
politics, and of doing academic work.  She makes it quite clear that these things as 
well as her reading, her research and making kin with her dogs, are the parts and 
persons and things with which she thinks and writes.  For example, her work is truly 
interdisciplinary, bringing together her early immersion in ethnology and the study 
of animal sociality, including her knowledge of biological and zoological theory and 
the scientific method, with social philosophy, feminism and feminist epistemology, 
anthropology and cultural studies. The way she works these different domains – 
academic, public and personal – helps her keep making openings, that are critical 
and forever political, but also constitutive.  
 
Haraway’s work as it performs connection and interdependency thus shows us ways 
to reimagine how our thinking, our methodology and our writing are interventions, 
that are in themselves ‘worldings’. In this she exhorts us not just to mark out our 
territory or to colonise or to persuade, nor just to kill off what's gone before. To truly 
speak truth to power we need do our intervening differently. She does not just make 
the personal, the social and political explicit, she makes them crucial to being able to 
think beyond how we are positioned and entangled: opening up our own existential 
historicity as well as that of the things we study is crucial to a methodology that 
helps us to turn dominant world-making over, and open up an alternative vision of 
how things can be done and can be understood, with profound material and 
experiential affects and effects.    So we can reimagine how every thought is thought, 
how every research proposal is constructed and every research project is done, and 
how every paper, blog or book is written, are the products of the conditions of 
possibility, the politics, which have made or unmade worlds, the worlds that 
entangle us and maybe oppress us. But, in making kin, in making connectivity and 
compost, we can with Haraway also make ways together of doing these things that 
can turn earlier, more destructive forms of world-making over. 
 
 
Joanna Latimer 
Professor of Sociology, Science & Technology,  
Department of Sociology, University of York. 
 
Chiew, F. (2014) Posthuman Ethics with Cary Wolfe and Karen Barad: Animal 
Compassion as Trans-Species Entanglement. Theory, Culture & Society, 31 (4): 51-
69. 
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